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ON ACCOUNT OF RACE OR COLOR: RACE AS CORPORATION
AND THE ORIGINAL UNDERSTANDING OF RACE

Reginald Oh
This Essay is a critique of constitutional and political discourse on
"race." I argue that current equal protection doctrine operates
under a conception of race that undermines rather than moves
forward the goal of achieving racial equality. That understanding
defines race solely or primarily as a physical trait or characteristic,
and unjustifiably rejects other, more robust notions of race. I argue
the notion of race as physical trait is inconsistent with the historical
understanding of race that served as the basis for the
Reconstruction Amendments. A careful examination of nineteenth
and early twentieth century court decisions, decisions which include
Plessy u. Ferguson 1 and Strauder u. West Virginia, 2 suggests that
the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments and the Supreme
Court Justices of that era thought of race, not as a physical trait,
but as an entity with a corporate existence. In other words, they
thought of race as corporation.
Part I will critique current equal protection doctrine and argue
that it has adopted a narrow and constitutionally problematic
definition of race as physical trait. Part II will then examine the
original understanding of race and discuss the concept of race as
corporation. Part III will then examine the implications of the race
as corporation concept for rethinking current equal protection
doctrine.
I

Political and legal discourse about race is often confusing and
bewildering because we often fail to fully understand that, as an
"essentially contested concept0," 3 "race" has no fixed, essential
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
100 U.S. 303 (1879).
3 W.B. Gallie, Essentially Contested Concepts, 56 PROC. ARISTOTELIAN Soc'Y, 167, 167-68
(1956) (describing "essentially contested concepts" as those that intrinsically have no fixed
meaning).
I

2
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meaning and is thus subject to multiple definitions. 4 In the post
Brown,5 late twentieth and early twenty-first century era, the
unstated, default assumption in legal discourse was that race refers
to a physical trait such as skin color, or an identity based on skin
color. 6 But of course, race as skin color or as racial identity is not
the only way to think about and conceive of race. Consequently,
when we engage in
racial discourse,
confusion
and
misunderstanding are inevitable if we forget about the
multidimensional nature of the concept of race.
Too often,
discursive actors assume that they hold the same assumptions
about the meaning of race when in actuality, they hold related but
different understandings. What's more, an actor will often use
multiple definitions of race without being consciously aware that he
or she is doing so.
Current equal protection doctrine on race is conceptually and
practically incoherent, in large part because there is an illusory
consensus regarding the constitutional meaning of race. Thus, in
Richmond v. Croson, Justices Sandra Day O'Connor and Thurgood
Marshall seemed to agree that the Fourteenth Amendment was
centrally concerned with the problem of race. 7 In her plurality
opinion, O'Connor asserted that, "[t]he Civil War Amendments
themselves worked a dramatic change in the balance between
congressional and state power over matters of race." 8 While
dissenting from O'Connor's opm10n, Marshall nevertheless
expressed his agreement with O'Connor's understanding of the
Fourteenth Amendment, stating, "[t]he three Reconstruction
Amendments undeniably 'worked a dramatic change in the balance
between congressional and state power."' 9
Yet, despite their agreement regarding the fundamental
relationship between the Fourteenth Amendment and "race,"
Justice O'Connor voted to strike down a local government race
conscious affirmative action program as a form of invidious racial
discrimination in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment's Equal
Protection Clause, 10 while Justice Marshall voted to uphold the
race-conscious set-aside as entirely consistent with the Fourteenth
4 See Sharona Hoffman, Is There a Place for "Race" as a Legal Concept?, 36 ARIZ. ST. L.J.
1093, 1096-97 (2004) (listing various different understandings ofrace).
5 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
s See Hoffman, supra note 4, at 1132.
7 Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
s Id. at 490.
9 Id. at 560 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
10 Id. at 511.
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Amendment Equal Protection Clause. 11
O'Connor and Marshall's disagreeable agreement over the
relationship between "race" and the Fourteenth Amendment
beautifully captures the essentially confused state of current equal
protection doctrine on race. To understand how the two justices
could come to different conclusions despite seemingly agreeing on
the centrality of race to equal protection doctrine, it is crucial to
understand that they are thinking about and using the term race in
very different ways. While O'Connor and the Rehnquist Court refer
to race solely as a physical trait, Marshall and critics of the
Rehnquist Court equal protection doctrine refer to race as a trait
and as a social group. The different approaches to race and equal
protection have had enormous doctrinal and political consequences.
The central doctrinal premise of current equal protection doctrine
is the notion that all governmental uses of race are inherently
arbitrary and irrational, and therefore laws relying on race must be
presumed to be unconstitutional and subject to the most rigorous
level of judicial scrutiny. 12 And under strict scrutiny analysis, the
government has the heavy burden to demonstrate that its use of
race is necessary to serve a compelling government interest. 13
Accordingly, if all uses of race are inherently suspect, then, the
argument is that even ''benign" uses of race in the context of
affirmative action equal opportunity and racial integration plans
should be subject to strict scrutiny.
Even well intentioned race-conscious affirmative action programs
run afoul of equal protection because they engage in the very
practice that the Fourteenth Amendment was designed to
eliminate-discrimination on the basis of race (skin color).
Government decisions based on race as skin color, even if those
decisions are made for legitimate or compelling purposes, would be
akin to making irrational decisions to award jobs and contracts
based on other morally and legally irrelevant traits like eye color or
hair color. 14
Reading Rehnquist Court decisions on race and equal protection,
one would get the clear sense that it is self-evident and inherently
correct that all uses of race are constitutionally suspect. As Justice
O'Connor explained, all "[c]lassifications based on race carry a
danger of stigmatic harm" and "they may in fact promote notions of
11
12

13
l<

Id. at 528 (Marshall, J., dissenting)
Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 720-21 (2007).
Id.
See id. at 726.
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racial inferiority and lead to a politics of racial hostility," even if a
classification is aimed at promoting racial equality. 15 Echoing
Justice O'Connor, Chief Justice Roberts emphasized in a 2007 equal
protection race case, "[g]overnment action dividing us by race is
inherently suspect because such classifications promote notions of
racial inferiority [leading] to a politics of racial hostility, [and]
reinforce the beliefD held by too many for too much of our history,
that individuals should be judged by the color of their skin." 16
However, the principle that all racial classifications are
inherently suspect is a recent doctrinal development. 17 During the
height of the civil rights era, the Court employed strict scrutiny
analysis to strike down racially discriminatory Jim Crow laws that
maintained and reinforced racial segregation. The Court, however,
subjected race-conscious affirmative action programs, to a lower
level of judicial scrutiny, as they were considered ''benign" racial
classifications deserving of greater legislative deference. But, at
least formally, that deference disappeared under the Rehnquist
Court, as the Court in Croson and Adarand held that all racial
classifications, whether benign in purpose or not, are equally
suspect, and must be subject to the same level of rigorous judicial
scrutiny. 18 The rhetoric and logic of current equal protection
doctrine have been extremely effective in undermining the
legitimacy and constitutionality of race-conscious equal opportunity
and racial integration plans.
While there have been many
insightful critiques of the various problems with current equal
protection doctrine, curiously, very few critiques have noticed or
emphasized how the current doctrine's rhetorical power
fundamentally depends on a very narrow definition of race solely as
skin color for its persuasiveness.
That rhetorical power is evident in the Supreme Court's 2007
decision in Parents Involved in Community Schools v. Seattle School
District Number One. 19 In that case, the Court held that voluntary
race-conscious admissions plans violated equal protection, even if
those plans were enacted by school districts to maintain and
promote racially integrated student bodies in their schools. 20

15

Croson, 488 U.S. at 493.

is Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 746 (internal quotations omitted).
17 See Croson, 488 U.S. at 490-91 (holding, for the first by a majority of the Court, that
''benign" racial classifications are subject to strict scrutiny).
is Id.; Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
19 551 U.S. 701 (2007).
20 Id. at 747-48.
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In a plurality decision written by Chief Justice Roberts, the Court
held that the school districts failed to demonstrate that its interest
in having racially integrated schools was a compelling interest. 21
Moreover, the Court concluded that their actual interest in making
race-conscious admissions decisions was not to promote racial
integration, but to engage in the patently illegitimate goal of naked
"racial balancing," which the Court defines as the goal of wanting a
racially proportionate student body purely for its own sake. 22 In
other words, the Roberts plurality sought to overrule the racial
integration mandate of Brown v. Board of Education and hold that
the goal of racial integration is an inherently illegitimate interest.
Although the Roberts Court ultimately failed in its attempt to
overrule Brown, the Court came very close to doing so. Only Justice
Kennedy's refusal to join Roberts and three other justices prevented
Brown's reversal. It is vital, therefore, to vigorously critique the
Court's reasoning in Parents Involved. Specifically, it is important
to become aware of how the way Roberts defined race to mean only
skin color was the basis for much of the rhetorical power of his
opinion.
First, one astounding aspect of Roberts' opinion is that, in
effectively seeking to overrule Brown, Roberts actually contended
that Warren Court and the NAACP Legal Defense Fund attorneys
who argued the Brown case would wholeheartedly support his
attempt to overrule Brown. And what is even more amazing is that
Roberts was able to make such arguments with a straight face and
in a persuasive manner.
In asserting that the NAACP attorneys who litigated Brown v.
Board of Education on behalf of the black plaintiffs would
wholeheartedly endorse his opinion, Roberts actually quotes a
passage from a brief written by one of the Brown lawyers:
As counsel who appeared before this Court for the plaintiffs
in Brown
put it: "We have one fundamental
contention ... and that contention is that no State has any
authority under the equal-protection clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment to use race as a factor in affording
educational opportunities among its citizens. 23
And because the school districts in Parents Involved are using
race (as skin color) as a factor in affording educational

21
22

2a

Id. at 730.
Id. at 727-31.
Id. at 747 (emphasis added).
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opportunities, Roberts contends that the NAACP Legal Defense
Fund attorneys clearly would support the Court's decision to strike
down the discriminatory racial integration plans. 24
Second, Roberts also very cleverly evoked the moral cause of the
Civil Rights Movement by arguing that the white students
challenging the voluntary school integration plan in Parents
Involved were similarly situated to the black schoolchildren who
sought integrated schooling in Brown v. Board of Education.
Roberts reasoned, "[b]efore Brown, schoolchildren were told where
they could and could not go to school based on the color of their skin.
The school districts in these [current] cases have not carried the
heavy burden of demonstrating that we should allow this once
again." 25 In other words, for Roberts, the white students in Parents
Involved were facing the very same discriminatory treatment that
the black plaintiffs forced to attend segregated schools faced in
Brown. Drawing Roberts' reasoning to its logical conclusion, the
black children in Parents Involved must then be equivalent to the
white children in Jim Crow south, as both groups, through their
parents, sought to protect and maintain racially discriminatory
school systems.
Third, Roberts rejects Justice Breyer's argument in dissent that
voluntary racial integration programs are constitutionally
distinguishable from Jim Crow school segregation laws because
racial integration plans seek to promote racial inclusion, while Jim
Crow segregation laws promoted the exclusion of particular racial
groups from meaningful educational opportunities. Roberts notes,
"Justice Breyer speaks of bringing 'the races' together (putting aside
the purely black-and-white nature of the plans), as the justification
for excluding individuals on the basis of their race." 26 Roberts
responds to his articulation of Breyer's position by effectively
arguing that any attempt to protect particular racial groups
through racial integration of public schools is an approach to race
that is "fundamentally at odds with our precedent, which makes
clear that the Equal Protection Clause 'protect[s] persons, not
groups."' 27 In other words, the goal of "bringing 'the races' together"
is inconsistent with equal protection, because that goal recognizes
and seeks to protect racial groups, and equal protection is not about
protecting racial groups. Rather, it is about ensuring that an
Id.
Id. (emphasis added).
2s Id. at 742-43.
27 Id. at 743 (quoting Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200, 227 (1995)).
2•

2s
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individual's dignity and worth are not demeaned by being "'judged
by [race] instead of by his or her own merit and essential
qualities."' 28
The brilliant aspect of Roberts' opinion is that, while it may seem
plain and clear that the Warren Court justices and the LDF
attorneys would not actually support its holding and reasoning, it is
difficult to explain exactly why not, especially given the passages
quoted by Roberts. Clearly, Roberts has taken those passages out of
context, but, how?

II
The key to critiquing the Roberts opinion in Parents Involved is to
explicitly point out and critique Robert's narrow use of race as skin
color. While the Rehnquist and Roberts Courts may define race to
mean solely skin color, the crucial point is that historically, race
meant something else entirely. And, only when it is understood
that the Brown Court and the LDF attorneys thought of race, not
just as skin color, but as corporation, does it become clear that that
the Brown litigants and justices would not support Roberts' opinion.
This Part will contend that current equal protection doctrine, in
defining race solely as skin color, is relying on a narrow conception
of race that is inconsistent with the original meaning of race as
understood by the framers of the Reconstruction Amendments, and
inconsistent with the more complex understanding of race held by
the Brown Court and by the Brown attorneys.
Rather, a preliminary examination of historical materials suggest
that the historical understanding of race that was the basis for the
Reconstruction Amendments was an understanding consistent with
the notion of race as social groups. Specifically, the tentative thesis
that will be developed and elaborated in future articles is this: the
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments and contemporary
Supreme Court Justices conceptualized "race" not as a physical
trait, but more broadly as a corporate-like entity, an entity with a
"corporate personality" separate and distinct from the identities of
its individual members.
A.

How did the Reconstruction framers think of and use the term

2s

Id. at 746 (quoting Rice v. Cayetano, 528 U.S. 495, 496 (2000)).
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race? In discerning the original meaning of race, it is important to
point out that both the Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments fail
to mention race at all. The Thirteenth Amendment prohibits most
forms of slavery and involuntary servitude with no reference to
race. Similarly, the Fourteenth Amendment protects the privileges
and immunities of all citizens, and the equal protection and due
process rights of all persons, but does not provide legal protections
specifically on the basis of race. And despite Justices O'Connor and
Marshall's belief that the Reconstruction Amendments as a whole
and the Fourteenth Amendment in particular dramatically shifted
the power to regulate race from states to the federal government,
there is no textual provision in the Fourteenth Amendment that
mandated that shift of power. Section Five of the Fourteenth
Amendment does grant Congress the power to enforce the other four
sections of the Amendment. However, none of those other four
sections mention race.
The Fifteenth Amendment is the only Reconstruction Amendment
that includes a textual reference to race. It states: "The right of
citizens of the United States to vote shall not be denied or abridged
by the United States or by any State on account of race, color, or
previous condition of servitude." 29 If the term race has no inherent
fixed meaning, the question arises, which particular meaning of
"race" constituted the framers' original understanding? To answer
this question, it is important to note that the Fifteenth Amendment
prohibits the infringement of the right to vote on the basis of both
"race" and "color." According to blackletter rules of constitutional
and statutory construction, each term in the Amendment must be
given independent meaning. That begs the question: what is the
difference between race and color?
First, beginning with the concept of "color," based on our twenty
first century understanding of the term, one may assume that the
term refers generally to the physical trait of skin color. However,
an examination of nineteenth and early twentieth century legal
sources discussing the meaning of the term color based on state
laws suggests that the term color in the Fifteenth Amendment was
referring, not to a universal physical trait, but, specifically to the
skin color of members of non-white races only.
In Rice u. Gong Lum, 30 the Supreme Court of Mississippi dealt
with the issue of where Chinese-American students fit within its

29 U.S. CONST. amend. XV, § 1.
ao 104 So. 105 (Miss. 1925), affd 275 U.S. 78 (1927).

2009]

On Account of Race or Color

1035

racially segregated school system. When Gong Lum was decided,
the Mississippi State Constitution required that "[s]eparate schools
shall be maintained for children of the white and colored races." 31
While the term "colored races" included African-Americans, the
question in Gong Lum was whether a Chinese-American student
should be considered white or colored under the state constitution.
The court held that a Chinese student was a member of the "colored
race" and therefore had to be assigned to schools attended by
African-American students. 32 The court reasoned,
One of the definitions given to the word "colored," as applied
to race, is "of a dark skin or non-Caucasian race." The same
definition is practically given by Mr. Webster in his
dictionary. The word "white," as applied to race, where not
affected by statutory definition, is universally limited to the
Caucasian race.33
In other words, the court concluded that the term "colored" did
not refer generically to skin color, but specifically to a person who
belonged to either "a dark skin or non-Caucasian race." 34 The term
color, according to the Mississippi Supreme Court, did not and was
not meant to include or refer to the skin color of members of the
white race.
An examination of a mid-nineteenth century California court
decision, People v. Hall, 35 also suggests that the term color was
historically understood to refer to the physical attributes associated
with non-white racial groups. In Hall, the issue was whether a
Chinese person should be categorized as legally white or black for
the purposes of testifying as a witness in an action involving a white
party. A California statute prohibited blacks or Indians from
testifying in an action involving a white person as a party. 36
However, the statute failed to explicitly mention Chinese or other
Asian nationalities and whether they were excluded as well. The
court held that a Chinese person is, for statutory purposes, a "black"
person and therefore excluded from participating as a witness. 37
The Hall court reasoned that the term ''black" has a broader
meaning than the term "negro": "The word 'Black' may include all

31
32
33
34
35
36
31

Id. at 107 (quoting MISS. CONST. art. VIII, § 207 (repealed 1977)).
Id. at llO.
Id. at 108.
Id.
4 Cal. 399 (1854).
Id. at 399.
Id. at 404.
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Negroes, but the term 'Negro' does not include all Black persons." 38
Thus, a Chinese person could be considered "black" for purposes of
the statute. However, because that analysis still did not answer the
question whether the Chinese person should be categorized as black
or white under the statute, the Hall court proceeded to define the
statutory meaning of the term "white." The court concluded, "[t]he
word "White" has a distinct signification, which ex vi termini,
excludes black, yellow, and all other colors." 39 In other words, under
the statute, while the term black was a broad term that could
include racial groups in addition to African-Americans, the term
white was a narrow term referring specifically and only to members
of the white or Caucasian race. Accordingly, because a Chinese
person clearly is not white or Caucasian, by default, the court held
that a Chinese person had to be deemed to be a "black person" for
purposes of the statute.
What about the term "race"? How was that term generally
understood when the Reconstruction Amendments were ratified?
The 1887 Webster's Dictionary defines "race" as "descendants of a
common ancestor; a family, tribe, people or nation, believed or
presumed to belong to the same stock." 40 This definition clearly is
defining something that is more than just a physical trait. The
definition seems to view race as discrete groups of people, or affinity
groups, groups of people connected together by principles, family
ties, or biology.
In Plessy v. Ferguson 41 the majority of the Court created the
"separate but equal" doctrine to justify the Constitutional basis for
laws that segregated whites from blacks in various social settings.
The Court further equates "race" with discrete racial groups by
saying that
We consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiffs
argument [that segregation is unconstitutional] to consist in
the assumption that the enforced separation of the two races
stamps the colored race with a badge of inferiority. If this be
so, it is not by reason of anything found in the act, but solely
because the colored race chooses to put that construction
upon it.... If the civil and political rights of both races be
equal one cannot be inferior to the other civilly or politically.
If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution
38

39

40
41

Id. at 403.
Id. at 404-05.
See Wamget v. State, 67 S.W.3d 851, 855 (Tex. Crim. App. 2001).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
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of the United States cannot put them upon the same plane. 4 2
In this famous passage, when the Court mentioned "race," it was
using race to refer to "race of people" or a racial group, and not
referring to it as a physical trait or skin color.
Even Justice Harlan in his Plessy dissent used the term race to
refer to racial groups:
The white race deems itself to be the dominant race in this
country. And so it is, in prestige, in achievements, in
education, in wealth and in power. So, I doubt not, it will
continue to be for all time, if it remains true to its great
heritage and holds fast to the principles of constitutional
liberty. 43
In this passage, Justice Harlan, along with the Plessy majority,
personifies the white and black races, treating them as if they were
individual persons with their own identity or personality. Thus, for
Harlan, the "white race," like a person, is well-educated, wealthy,
and powerful.
In personifying the white and black races, the Plessy majority and
dissent both seem to understand "race" as corporate-like entity.
While an in depth discussion of race as corporation is beyond the
scope of this essay, I want to lay out the basic argument for that
understanding of race.
Under the well-settled law of corporations, once properly
incorporated, a corporation has the legal status of a "person," and
has various legal rights and duties as a "natural person" would
have. 44 As a legal "person," a corporation has its own corporate
identity or personality independent and distinct from the
personalities of the individuals who make up the corporation. 45
Similarly, a careful examination of the opinions in Plessy suggests
that the Justices conceived of "race" in corporation-like terms.
Justice Harlan discussed not the achievements of individual white
Americans, but the achievements, wealth, and power of the "white
race." 46 The Plessy majority treated the white and black races as if
they were persons capable of holding particular political and civil

Id. at 551-52 (emphasis added).
Id. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
44 See generally David Millon, Theories of the Corporation, 1990 DUKE L.J. 201, 203 (1990)
("[T]he corporation, like any other person, should enjoy the freedom to act as a socially
responsible citizen."); John Dewey, The Historic Background of Corporate Legal Personality,
35 YALE L.J. 655 (1926) (describing the legal treatment of a corporation).
45 See Dewey, supra note 44, at 669.
46 See Plessy, 163 U.S. at 559 (Harlan, J. dissenting).
42

4a
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rights, in the same way corporations are legally able to have rights
that are qualitatively different than the rights that individual
members of the corporation may have.
In Strauder v. West Virginia, the Supreme Court analyzed the
issue of racial discrimination in jury selection utilizing the notion of
race as corporation. 47 In Strauder, the Court struck down under
equal protection grounds a West Virginia law prohibiting black men
from serving on juries. In striking down the law, the Court did not
talk in the language of personal rights, nor did it talk about the
dangers of discriminating on the basis of a suspect trait such as
skin color. Rather, the Court reasoned that the law excluding black
men from jury service was a form of invidious discrimination that
"impl[ied] [legal] inferiority in civil society, [which] lessen[ed] the
security of. . . [the right of the colored race and was a] stepO
towards reducing them to the condition of a subject race." 48
In viewing Strauder as a decision about race as corporation, the
decision becomes less about an individual's right to serve on a jury,
and more about the protection of the black race as a corporate
entity. The protection of an individual's right to serve on a jury can
be understood as a means to prevent the ''black race" from being
reduced to the status of a "subject race" through racially
discriminatory and exclusionary laws aimed at members of the
black race.
I suggest that this, then, w as the original
understanding of race and equal protection.

III
I want to conclude this essay by exploring the implications of
analyzing "race" in historical-linguistic context. First, if in fact the
framers of the Reconstruction Amendments understood race as
having corporation-like attributes, then, the Court's assertion that
equal protection doctrine protects individuals but not racial groups
is inconsistent with a historical understanding of the
Reconstruction Amendments. Thus, if "original meaning" is to be
given any weight in determining what race means for equal
protection purposes, then the current doctrinal focus on protecting
individuals but not groups is misplaced.
Second, if the notion of race solely as skin color is not supported
by original meaning, then the question arises, what is the

100 U.S. 303 (1879).
s Id. at 308.

41
4
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constitutional justification for defining race in that way? And, what
is the constitutional justification for rejecting a conception of race
that is more consistent with original meaning? If there is no solid
constitutional basis to reduce the meaning of race to a physical
trait, then it becomes much easier to argue that the current
conception of race in equal protection law arises in large part due to
the Justices' naked policy and moral preferences. Reducing race to
skin color may have no justification or function other than to
restrict and undermine the scope and breadth of affirmative action
plans seeking to expand equal opportunity for racial minorities.
Arguably, that has been the agenda of the Court from Bakke 49 on
from Bakke to Croson 50 to Adarand51 to Grutter 52 and then to
Parents Involved-which was Roberts' ultimately failed attempt to
effectively overrule Brown v. Board of Education 53 and its racial
integration mandate. 54
Third, understanding race as corporation helps us to better
understand the purpose and function of racial segregation in public
schools: segregation operated to protect the "corporate personality"
of the white race. In Rice v. Gong Lum, the Mississippi Supreme
Court explained:
To all persons acquainted with the social conditions of this
state and of the Southern states generally it is well known
that it is the earnest desire of the white race to preserve its
racial integrity and purity, and to maintain the purity of the
social relations as far as it can be done by law. 55
The court then explained that segregation helps maintain the
purity of the white race by preventing race amalgamation or the
mixing or corrupting of the white race with inferior races. 56
Segregation of school children was vital to preventing race
amalgamation, because segregationists feared that if white and

Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265 (1978).
City of Richmond v. J.A. Croson Co., 488 U.S. 469 (1989).
51 Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena, 515 U.S. 200 (1995).
52 Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003).
53 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
54 Parents Involved in Cmty. Schs. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701 (2007). The
Roberts opinion failed to gain the necessary fifth vote to make it binding Court precedent.
Although Justice Anthony Kennedy concurred in the Court's plurality opinion and voted to
strike down the voluntary integration plans at issue in Parents Involved, Kennedy did not
agree with the plurality's holding that racial diversity is not a compelling interest. He
instead struck down the plans on narrow tailoring grounds. Id. at 751, 760 (Kennedy, J.,
concurring).
55 Rice v. Gong Lum, 104 So. 105, 108 (Miss. 1925) (emphasis added).
5s Id. at llO.
49

50
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black children attended school together as social equals, interracial
relationships and marriages would become normalized and over
time, the amalgamation of the races would result in the destruction
of the white race and the creation of a mongrel or mixed-race
nation. To use the language of corporations, segregation was an
essential tool to preserve and maintain the distinct and superior
corporate identity of the "white race."
Finally, thinking of race as corporation helps us to more
effectively critique Roberts' opinion in Parents Involved. Once we
understand that the Brown Court and the LDF attorneys did not
think of race solely as a physical trait, then, it becomes clear that
their understanding of race does not support the reasoning and
holding in Parents Involved. In fact, the entire desegregation case
law that followed in wake of Brown would not make any sense if the
concept of race as corporation was erased from equal protection
doctrine and race was understood solely as a physical trait.
IV. CONCLUSION

A central goal of this essay was to clarify the constitutional and
political discourse on race. To gain clarity, it is crucial to carefully
understand that race is a term with multiple meanings; otherwise,
confusion and obfuscation inevitably result if agreement regarding
its meaning is assumed. And as this essay has suggested, any
project to reconstruct equal protection doctrine on race will benefit
from exploring and analyzing the concept of race as corporation.
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